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Abstract.  We estimate a double hurdle (DH) model of the Hungarian wage distribution as-
suming censoring at the minimum wage and wage under-reporting (i.e. compensation consist-
ing of the minimum wage, subject to taxation, and an unreported cash supplement). We esti-
mate the probability of under-reporting for minimum wage earners, simulate their genuine 
earnings and classify them and their employers as ‘cheaters’ and ‘non-cheaters’. In the pos-
session of the classification we check how cheaters and non-cheaters reacted to the introduc-
tion of a minimum social security contribution base, equal to 200 per cent of the minimum 
wage, in 2007. The findings suggest that cheaters were more likely to raise the wages of their 
minimum wage earners to 200 per cent of the minimum wage thereby reducing the risk of tax 
audit. Cheating firms also experienced faster average wage growth and slower output growth. 
The results suggest that the DH model is able to identify the loci of wage under-reporting with 
some precision. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The evasion of payroll taxes has two main forms. One is unreported (black) employment, 
when the employee is not registered and neither she nor her employer pays any taxes. The 
other main form is the under-reporting of wages, or grey employment, when the compensa-
tion consists of an officially paid amount, subject to taxation, and an unreported supplement 
also known as an “envelope wage” or “under the counter payment”. In order to maximize the 
total evaded tax, the officially paid wage is often (but not always) chosen as the minimum 
wage (MW).  
 
In this paper we estimate the prevalence of disguised MW earners with the double hurdle 
(DH) model, first proposed by Cragg (1971), using linked employer-employee data. The DH 
is a potentially suitable method for disentangling genuine from ‘fake’ MW earners, relying on 
the assumption that MW payment is governed by two different processes: market imperfec-
tions implying censoring at the MW, on the one hand, and non-random selection to wage un-
der-reporting, on the other. Our application of the DH for Hungary assumes that a spike at the 
MW was observed for two reasons (i) because of constraints and costs preventing firms from 
firing all low-productivity workers after a wave of exceptionally large hikes in the MW and 
(ii) because of tax fraud. That said, a worker’s genuine wage is observed only if her produc-
tivity exceeds the MW and her wage is fully reported. The DH model simultaneously deals 
with the censoring problem and selection to tax fraud, and estimates the probability of cheat-
ing for each MW earner. In the possession of the parameters one can also simulate the ‘genu-
ine’ wages of MW earners. 
 
The DH model’s reliance on distributional properties (as well as the difficulty in finding ex-
clusion restrictions for the selection equation) warns us not to take the estimates at face value.  
Therefore, we test the validity of the DH results by exploiting a unique episode of Hungary’s 
unconventional MW policies. The test examines the introduction of a minimum contribution 
base amounting to 200 per cent of the minimum wage (2MW), in 2007. After the introduction 
of the reform, firms paying wages lower than 2MW faced an increased probability of tax au-
thority audit and a higher risk of being detected as cheaters. Firms were required to report that 
they paid wages below 2MW and provide evidence, upon request, that their low-wage work-
ers were paid at the going market rate. The reform created incentives for cheating firms to 
raise the reported wages of MW earners to 2MW while non-cheaters (those paying genuine 
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minimum wages) had no interest to do so. We distinguish cheaters from non-cheaters on the 
basis of DH estimates for 2006 and check how the cheating proxies affected the probability 
that a worker earning the MW in 2006 earned 2MW in 2007. We also study how the wages of 
MW earners changed in 2006-2007. We find that suspected cheaters were more likely to shift 
their workers from MW to 2MW compared to non-cheating firms. Furthermore, we find that 
the sales revenues of cheating firms were adversely affected by the reform. 
 
At least in the East and South-East of Europe, MW policies are strongly influenced by the 
conviction that nearly all MW workers earn untaxed side payments. Our results suggest that 
while the suspicions are not groundless they are overstated: we estimate the share of ‘dis-
guised’ MW earners to be around 50 per cent and the share of cheating enterprises to fall 
short of 40 per cent. The high share of non-cheating firms and genuine MW earners warns 
against radical, fiscally motivated experiments with the MW, which may put unskilled jobs at 
risk. While the statistical profiles derived from the DH model may help the better targeting of 
tax authority inspection they can also facilitate more circumspect MW policies. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the literature while 
Section 3 the MW regulations and the wage distribution in Hungary. Section 4 introduces the 
DH model, explains the estimation of its parameters, shows how the probability of cheating 
and ‘genuine’ wages are simulated and how we classify workers and firms on the basis of the 
DH estimates. Section 5 introduces the data. Section 6 presents the estimates of the DH mod-
el. Section 7 presents the methods, data and results of the test and Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Wage under-reporting and the minimum wage – An under-researched area 
 
Compared to the vast literature on income under-reporting and MW regulations, respectively, 
the body of research on how these two areas relate to each other seems rather thin. Most of 
what we know empirically about this relationship comes from anecdotal evidence, inspection 
of aggregate data, scarce survey results and a few attempts to identify the incidence of enve-
lope wages indirectly. Theoretical work is largely missing. 
 
Although several mechanisms may cause a spike of the wage distribution at the MW, includ-
ing the tacit collusion of employers (Shelkova 2008) or the extrusion of wages due to the ef-
fective MW (DiNardo et al. 1996), grey employment is certainly among the suspects. Cross-
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country data suggest a positive correlation between the size of the spike and estimated size of 
the informal economy (Tonin 2007). Several accession countries including Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Romania have (or had) high shares of MW earners, while their Kaitz-indices 
are (were) in the middle range, suggesting that disguised MWs may be particularly wide-
spread in these countries. Similar observations are interpreted in a similar way in World Bank 
(2005). 
 
Erdogdu (2009) reports on the basis of several surveys that under-the-counter payments are 
prevalent in the wage policy of Turkish firms. There is a relatively extensive literature focus-
ing on grey employment in the Baltic states. Relying on survey results, Masso and Krillo 
(2009) point out that 16-23 percent of the MW earners received envelope wages in Estonia 
and Latvia but only 8 percent in Lithuania in 1998. Meriküll and Staehr (2010) show that 
young employees and people working in construction and trade are most likely to get unre-
ported cash supplement on top of their official salary in the three Baltic countries. Kriz et al. 
(2007) present similar results on the distribution of envelope wages using three different Es-
tonian data sets. According to the Eurobarometer survey conducted by the European Commis-
sion in 2007 (European Commission 2007), 5 per cent of employees in the EU receive part or 
all of their regular income untaxed and this ratio is over 10 per cent in some central and east-
ern European countries (8 per cent in Hungary) but there is no information on how many of 
them are officially paid the MW.  
 
Some studies obtain evidence on disguised MWs indirectly, by comparing the reported con-
sumption-income profiles of households. Using household budget survey data from Hungary, 
Benedek et al (2006) looked at the winners and losers from the 2001-2002 MW hikes. They 
observed income loss without the loss of a wage earner in the high-income brackets where 
substantial under-reporting is most likely to occur. For these households the increasing MW 
may have implied higher taxes and lower net income. Based on the same data set, Tonin 
(2011) analyzed changes in the food consumption of households affected by the minimum 
wage hike compared to unaffected households of similar income. He found that food con-
sumption fell in the treatment group relative to the controls – a fact potentially explained by a 
fall in their unreported income in response to the MW hike and growth of the associated tax 
burden.  
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The theories of wage under-reporting (Allingham and Sandmo 1972, Yaniv 1988) shed light 
on the incentives to engage in tax fraud under alternative penalty and withdrawal schemes but 
they do not explicitly discuss the case of reporting the MW to tax authorities. This is the cost-
minimizing choice for the firm (unless MW payment provokes audits thereby decreasing the 
expected gain from cheating) but it also requires the cooperation of workers. As Madzharova 
(2010) notes: if the actual or perceived linkages between contribution payments and pensions 
or access to health services are weak and/or workers see that their payments feed corruption 
rather than are used to finance public services, they will be willing to accept the lowest possi-
ble reported wage.  
 
Theoretical models explicitly addressing the issue of wage under-reporting cum MW regula-
tions include Tonin (2011) and Shelkova (2008). Tonin argues that the MW induces some 
workers whose productivity is above the MW, but who would have declared less if there was 
no MW, to increase their declared earnings to the MW level. Workers with productivity be-
low the MW either work in the black market or withdraw from the labor force while high-
productivity workers are unaffected. This is a possible explanation of why a spike at the MW 
appears in the distribution of declared earnings. Shelkova assumes that low productivity labor 
is homogenous and easy to replace thanks to the low fixed costs of hiring. If a non-binding 
MW exists and employers act symmetrically then tacit collusion and offering the MW to low 
productivity workers is profit maximizing and dominant strategy for the companies. An in-
crease in the minimum wage increases the probability of collusion since the incentive for de-
viation is weaker. This implies that a higher MW increases the spike there.  
 
Our empirical work attributes the sudden nascence and decease of a huge spike at the MW to 
state intervention, on the one hand, and tax evasion, on the other. We look at a unique period 
in Hungary’s MW history, which quadrupled the spike at the MW in only two years (when 
the MW was nearly doubled in 2001-2002) and decreased it by a factor of 2.5 in only one 
year (when a double contribution base was introduced in 2007). We do not believe that these 
sudden and enormous changes could be explained by the established strategic behavior of 
enterprises underlying Shelkova’s model. It is also hard to trust that Tonin’s assumption, stat-
ing that the marginal products of those at the spike exceed the MW, was valid in the period 
we are looking at. When the plan of increasing the MW from Ft 25,500 to Ft 50,000 was an-
nounced, 32.7 per cent of the private sector employees earned less than that. When the idea of 
the minimum contribution base came up, 58 per cent had wages below 2MW. It is quite obvi-
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ous that the vast majority of the affected workers remained in employment for a protracted 
period (or until recently) and many of them had productivity below the aforementioned 
thresholds after the hikes. It took time until mobility between jobs, changes of the product 
mix and technology, adult training and other forms of adjustment could restore (if at all) the 
optimum condition for mutually gainful employment without causing massive unemployment 
in between.2 Therefore, we stick to the assumption that in the period under examination the 
spike at the MW was explained by under-reporting and the continuing employment of many 
low-productivity workers – two different processes that we try to model following the DH 
approach. 
 
3. The minimum wage and the wage distribution in Hungary 
 
MW regulations had minor impact on the Hungarian wage distribution until the millennium.3 
As shown in Figure 1, the MW-average wage ratio slightly decreased in 1992-2000 and fell 
short of Spain’s, the laggard within the EU in that period. The fraction of workers paid 95-105 
per cent of the minimum amounted to 5 per cent, a ratio similar to those reported by Dolado et 
al. (1996) for Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and the US.  
 
In 2001–2002 the MW was nearly doubled in nominal terms, resulting in a 14 percentage 
point rise in the Kaitz-index.4 The fraction of private sector employees earning near the MW 
jumped to 11 per cent in 2001 and 18 per cent in 2002. 
 
Figure 1 
 
The wage distribution preserved its distorted shape until 2007, when a second spike appeared 
at 200 per cent of the MW, as shown in Figure 2.5 That year, the Hungarian government in-
troduced a minimum social security contribution base amounting to 2MW. Firms were al-
lowed to pay wages lower than 2MW but in case they did so they faced an increased probabil-
                                                 
2 Independent studies by Halpern et al. (2004) and Kertesi and Köllő (2003) estimated the short-run aggregate 
disemployment effect of the first MW hike to fall to the range of 1-1.5 per cent in 2001.  
3 See Appendix 2 for further details of Hungary’s MW regulations. 
4 The MW increased from Ft 25,500 in 2000 to Ft 40,000 on January 1, 2001 and Ft 50,000 on January 1, 2002. 
See Kertesi and Köllő (2003) on the motives and aftermaths of the large hikes. 
5 At the same time further minima were introduced for young and older skilled workers (1.2MW, 1.25MW) that 
flattened the spike near the MW. 
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ity of tax authority audit and a higher risk of being detected as cheaters (for paying disguised 
MW or for other reasons).6 
 
Figure 2 
 
The suspicion that the crowding of workers at the MW in 2001-2006 was partly explained by 
wage under-reporting is difficult to avert. In 2006, the fraction of MW earners amounted to 18 
per cent among small firm managers, and close to 10 per cent among top managers in larger 
firms also earned the MW. High shares could be observed in a number of freelance occupa-
tions such as architects, lawyers, accountants, business and tax advisors, agents, brokers, art-
ists, writers, film-makers, actors and musicians (13-17 per cent). The fraction was particularly 
high in those sectors, where cash transactions with customers frequently occur such as shops, 
hotels and restaurants (23 per cent), house building (21 per cent), personal services (18 per 
cent) and farming (21 per cent). In some low-wage occupations such as cleaners, porters and 
guards the fraction earning the MW fell short of the above-mentioned levels (Table 1). 
  
Table 1 
 
Further doubts arise if we look at the wage distribution within occupations (Figure 3). In 
2006, the distribution for unskilled workers was strongly skewed at the MW with a small 
number of workers earning substantially more than that. By contrast, the wage distribution of 
managers, for instance, had a spike at the MW and another at 440 per cent of the MW, clearly 
pointing to a minority of managers under-reporting their earnings. 
 
Figure 3 
 
With the help of the double hurdle model we can utilize the information content of the differ-
ent shapes of the wage distributions. In the next section we summarize how the estimation 
proceeds, how the probability of under-reporting and the MW earners’ ‘genuine’ wages are 
derived, and how we classify workers and firms as cheaters or non-cheaters. 
 
4. The double hurdle model 
 
                                                 
6 Similar minimum contribution levels were introduced in Bulgaria and Croatia in 2003. The Hungarian regula-
tions remained in effect until January 2010. 
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4.1. The set-up of the model  
 
Let us use the notation y for the (normalized) logarithm of the “true” wage, i.e. of the wage 
which would prevail in the absence of MW and under-reporting. (We normalize y to be zero 
at the true MW.) The value of y is determined by some characteristics X of the employee and 
the firm, and we assume that its distribution is conditionally normal with expectation Xβ and 
variance σ2. (This is a standard assumption in the literature; see e.g. Meyer and Wise 1983a 
and 1983b.) In the presence of MW and under-reporting, a spike appears at the MW in the 
wage distribution. The observed wage (the logarithm of which – normalized again to be zero 
at the MW – will be denoted by y*) may be equal to the MW for two reasons: because of con-
straints and costs preventing firms from firing low-productivity workers (in the simplest case 
those whose genuine wage would fall below the MW), or because of tax fraud (when the MW 
is reported to the authorities but an unobserved cash supplement is also given). The probabil-
ity of cheating is determined by some characteristics Z of the employee and the firm, and X 
may be different from Z. Formally, omitting subscript i for the individual, the following mod-
el governs y and y*: 
 
(1) uXy += β , 
 
and we observe the reported log-wage y* according to the rule: 
 
(2)  


 >+γ>+β
=∗
                               otherwise  0
0vZ and 0uX if   y
y . 
 
Under-reporting occurs when both Xβ+u>0 and Zγ+v≤0 hold, and in this case the observed 
wage is equal to the MW. The residuals u and v are zero-mean normally distributed, possibly 
correlated (ρ) random variables. σ2 stands for the variance of u while the variance of v is set 
equal to unity without loss of generality, hence the covariance matrix of (u, v) is given by: 
 
(3) 





ρσ
ρσσ
=
1
S
2
22
. 
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This is the double hurdle model first proposed by Cragg (1971), with the restriction ρ=0, to 
model the purchase of consumer goods in a setting where the decision to buy and the decision 
of how much to buy are governed by different processes. The name of the model comes from 
the fact that the spike of the distribution (in our case at the MW) is determined by two “hur-
dles”: a standard tobit-type constraint (in our case following from the wage equation: 
Xβ+u≤0) and a different second hurdle (following from the selection equation: Zγ+v≤0). Note 
that the standard tobit model is obtained as a special case when the second hurdle is not effec-
tive, e.g. when Z contains a sufficiently large constant and all other terms in γ are zero, or 
when X=Z, β=γ (apart from a constant), ρ=1 and σ=1. In our case, a second hurdle is needed 
because under-reporting and wage determination are governed by partly different processes. 
 
Since the paper of Cragg the model and its extensions have been widely used to analyze con-
sumer and producer behavior as well as problems in environmental and agricultural econom-
ics and banking (e.g. Labeaga 1999, Martinez-Espineira 2006, Moffatt 2005, Saz-Salazar and 
Rausell-Köster 2006, Teklewold et al. 2006). However, to our knowledge, only Shelkova 
(2008) used the model to analyze wage distributions, in a setting discussed earlier. 
 
Figure 4  
 
In our application, the baseline DH model (1)-(3) has to be slightly modified in order to better 
capture the features of the wage formation process. The first problem to be addressed is that 
the log wage distribution is not censored normal because of the crowding of wage earners just 
above the MW 7 (see Panel A in Figure 4). While at and above the median the distribution is 
close to the normal we have more workers on the left tail than expected under normality. This 
poses a problem because – as usual for nonlinear models – maximum likelihood estimation of 
the DH model yields consistent results only if the underlying distributions are well-specified. 
Therefore we apply a preliminary transformation that is roughly linear at higher wages and 
accounts for ’crowding’ at lower wages. We assume that instead of y* we observe g(y*), where 
r is a coefficient to be determined: 
(4)  .0x  if    r)r/xexp(rx)x(g ≥−−⋅+=  
                                                 
7 This is explained by spillover effect as argued in Dickens et al. (1994) and elsewhere. 
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By the preliminary transformation g-1 we can ensure that y* is close to a (censored) normal 
distribution and hence the DH model can be applied. Our approach is in line with the double 
hurdle literature, where a preliminary transformation is often needed to achieve normality: 
Martinez-Espineira (2006) and Moffatt (2005) use the Box-Cox, while Yen and Jones (1997) 
apply the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation.   
 
The second possible problem concerns our assumption that cheating employers report the 
MW (and not a larger wage) to the authorities. This is a reasonable assumption for 2001-2006 
because firms could maximize the evaded tax this way and the chance of tax audit was not 
increased for MW-reporting firms before 2007. The model can be extended to allow for cheat-
ing above the MW (see Elek et al. 2009) but external (e.g. survey-based) information is need-
ed to identify its parameters. In this paper, we use the simpler formulation.               
 
4.2. Parameter estimation  
 
First, the parameter r of the preliminary transformation (4) should be determined. Instead of a 
likelihood-based statistical procedure, we make use of the fact that the wage distribution was 
close to lognormal in 2000 (see Figure 2), changed substantially because of the MW increase 
and spillover effects in 2001-2002, and – in the absence of further drastic MW hikes – was 
practically unaltered in 2003-2006. Thus we create a quasi panel subsample of the LEED data 
for 2000-2002, and assign the median of the 2002 logarithmic wages (normalized to be zero at 
the MW) to the median of the 2000 logarithmic wages (again normalized) for each percentile 
of the wage distribution in 2000. (See section 5 for details of the LEED data set.) This graph 
hence shows the change in (normalized) logarithmic wages between 2000 and 2002 by per-
centiles. Finally, the function g (with unknown parameter r) is fitted to the percentile graph 
with nonlinear least squares. This function gives a transformation for the log-wages in 2002 
and – for the reasons mentioned above – for 2006 as well.   
 
Our method yields r=0.49. Figure 5 displays the function and its appropriate fit to the 2000-
2002 wage percentiles, while Panel B in Figure 4 shows that the transformed log wages (g-
1(y*)) are approximately censored normal. For ease of notation, in what follows, we refer to g-
1(y*) as y*.         
 
Figure 5 
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Using the properties of the conditional distributions of the bivariate normal distribution, the 
likelihood function of the DH model (1)-(3) can be shown to have the following form (for the 
sake of clarity, here we use subscripts i for the individuals): 
 
(5) ( )[ ]
( )
∏∏
>
∗
∗
=
σρ
∗∗


















σ
β−
φ
σ












ρ−
β−
σ
ρ
+γ
Φ⋅γβΦ−=
0y
ii
2
iii
0y
ii1,,
ii
xy1
1
xyz
z,x1L ,  
 
where 1,,σρΦ  denotes the bivariate normal distribution with covariance matrix given in (3), 
while Φ  and φ  stand for the univariate standard normal distribution and density, respectively. 
Parameter estimation can be carried out with maximum likelihood, where we use cluster-
robust standard errors to tackle the potential within-firm correlation in the error terms. 
 
If the DH model is correctly specified (including the distributional assumptions), then identi-
fication can be carried out even if X=Z, i.e. based merely on nonlinearities. However, to make 
the results more robust to deviations from the distributional assumptions, it is worth including 
variables that only influence the selection equation but not the wage equation (i.e. making 
valid exclusion restrictions). Therefore, in the wage equation we include the usual variables 
thought of as influencing the productivity of a worker such as her individual characteristics 
(experience, education, sex) and the characteristics of her firm (industry, productivity, fixed 
assets, location, size and ownership).8 Since the majority of these variables affect cheating 
behavior as well, they are also present in the selection equation. (e.g. for larger firms it is 
more difficult to hide envelope wages from the tax authority thus they tend to be less involved 
in grey employment.)  
 
We also include individual and firm-level proxies directly affecting the decision to evade tax-
es. In particular, we distinguish some occupational categories that are more prone to cheating 
than others, mainly due to the lower risk of being caught such as managerial and freelance 
occupations, occupations with frequent cash transactions or jobs in trade, hotels and restau-
rants (see Table 2 and Appendix Table A1 for definitions). We also choose proxies for tax 
                                                 
8 For robustness check, in an alternative specification we use occupation dummies instead of industry dummies 
in the wage equation. 
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evasion from the corporate tax returns. It is expected that wage-underreporting firms tend to 
evade corporate taxation, thus tax liability correlates negatively with cheating. Another proxy 
is “other personnel related expenses” which contain fringe benefits: these are rather comple-
mentary to wage payments hence a high share of personnel related costs indicates compliance 
to the tax rules. The chosen indicators are indicative of compliance with the tax rules in fields 
other than wage payment. It is reasonable to assume that, after controlling for the usual fac-
tors in the wage equation, the firm-level instruments only influence the probability of cheating 
but not the genuine wages thus we have valid exclusion restrictions in the model.  
 
4.3. Under-reporting probabilities, ‘genuine’ wages and classification of workers and firms 
 
In the possession of the DH parameters the probability of cheating for each MW earner can be 
estimated as: 
(6)  
)Z,X(1
)Z,X()/X(
)Zv,Xu(P1
)Zv,Xu(P)Xu(P
)0y|0vZ,0uX(P)tingunderrepor(P
1,,
1,,
*
γβΦ−
γβΦ−σβΦ
=
=
γ−>β−>−
γ−>β−>−β−>
=
==≤+γ>+β=
σρ
σρ
 
 
Also, we can simulate the genuine wage of each MW earner as follows. We generate inde-
pendent copies of bivariate normal random variables (u, v) with covariance matrix given in 
(3), and accept max (Xβ+u, 0) as the normalized genuine log-wage of an MW earner if 
Xβ+u≤0 or Zγ+v≤0. If none of these conditions hold, the person cannot earn MW according 
to the model. Technically, for each MW-earner, the (u,v) variables are simulated until at least 
one condition holds. 
 
Let us denote the estimated probability of under-reporting by a MW earner with P and the 
simulated wage with w (i.e. w=MW*exp(g(y) ). As a benchmark definition cheating behavior 
is assumed in case of P>0.5, but w>MW and w>1.5MW will also be used for robustness 
checks.9 If we find at least one MW earner classified as “cheater” in a firm we treat the firm 
as a cheater. Since the majority of cheating firms are small, the use of other, more advanced 
                                                 
9 The definition P>0.5 is preferable to e.g. w>MW because the latter includes some extra simulation uncertain-
ties. 
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criteria such as a certain threshold for the ratio of cheaters would be of limited practical im-
portance.  
 
5. Data  
 
Throughout the paper we rely on the Wage Survey (WS) of the National Employment Ser-
vice. The WS is a linked employer-employee data set recently comprising observations on 
over 150,000 individuals in about 20,000 firms and budget institutions. The survey was car-
ried out tri-annually until 1992 and annually since then. In the enterprise sector the WS covers 
businesses employing at least 5 workers. All Hungarian firms employing more than 20 work-
ers are obliged to report data for the WS while smaller firms are randomly selected from the 
census of enterprises. In the years considered in our paper, firms employing 5-20 workers had 
to report individual data on each employee while larger ones reported data on a (roughly 10 
per cent) random sample of their workers, selected on the basis of their day of birth. The ob-
servations are weighted by the Employment Service to correct for the selection of firms and 
individuals. The survey contains information on the wages and demographic and human capi-
tal variables of the workers and their job characteristics. The firm-level variables comprise 
industry, region, firm size, location, ownership, union coverage and financial variables includ-
ing sales revenues, the net value of fixed assets, average wages, profits and several cost items. 
Our estimation sample covers the private sector and comprises 92,140 observations. 
 
In section 7, we use panels of individual and firm-level observations. Firms in the WS can be 
directly linked and followed over time. Individuals cannot be linked directly but they can be 
identified across waves with acceptable precision using data on their firm identifier, location 
of their workplace, year of birth, gender, education and four-digit occupational code. The 
worker and firm panels are non-randomly selected from the base-period (2006) populations 
because of the survey design, on the one hand, and group-specific differences in firm survival, 
job destruction and quits, on the other. We control for selection on observables by estimating 
probit equations and using the inverse of the predicted probabilities of being in the panel as 
weights in those models, where weighting is allowed (for the method used see e.g. Moffit et 
al. 1999). The probits are presented in Tables A2 and A3 of Appendix 1. While the probabil-
ity of making it to the panel was clearly non-random, weighting still had negligible effect on 
the estimated parameters.  
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6. Results of the double hurdle model 
 
Table 2 presents the parameter estimates of the DH model. The parameters of the selection 
equation largely conform to intuition. ‘Grey’ occupations, male workers and employees in 
Budapest tend to under-report wages significantly, while foreign ownership, firm size, higher 
corporate tax liability and larger ‘other personnel related expenses’ of the firm are positively 
correlated with labor tax compliance. After controlling for other factors, education does not 
seem to have a direct effect on cheating. The correlation between the error terms (ρ) is signifi-
cantly negative, implying that unobserved factors leading to higher genuine wages tend to 
increase the probability of cheating. Similar results are obtained in the alternative specifica-
tion, when occupation dummies (defined in Table A1) are used instead of industry dummies 
in the wage equation.      
 
Table 2 
 
Using the estimated parameters, the probability of under-reporting among MW earners and 
their genuine wages was calculated. The results suggest that around half of all workers paid 
the MW hid part of their earnings from the tax authority. We estimate that the average „genu-
ine” wage of the MW earners amounted to approximately 170 per cent of the MW and the 
average wage of cheating MW employees (using w>MW as the criterion for cheating) was 
around 250 per cent of MW. We should note that the exact share of cheaters and their simu-
lated genuine wages are quite sensitive to the parameter r of the preliminary transformation 
but – more importantly from a modeling point of view – the partial effects of the different 
factors (occupations etc.) are robust across different specifications.   
 
Table 3 
 
Table 3 displays the estimated probability of under-reporting among MW earners, their aver-
age genuine wage and a “cheating indicator” by occupation, industry and firm size for the two 
different specifications.10 (The cheating indicator is defined as the share of cheating MW 
earners among all employees.) Looking at occupations, the estimated fraction of cheaters 
among MW earners is small for cleaners (10-20 per cent), unskilled laborers and agricultural 
                                                 
10 One is the baseline specification containing industry dummies in the wage equation, while the other contains 
occupation dummies instead.  
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workers (20-30 per cent), while it is much larger than average e.g. for drivers and approaches 
100 per cent for managers and professionals. It is also clear that the share of MW earners is 
not a good indicator of under-reporting because fraud is relatively frequent for some occupa-
tions with a high share of MW earners (e.g. in construction), while infrequent for others (e.g. 
among cleaners, unskilled laborers). The cheating indicator, which is the product of these two 
terms, is substantially higher than average in construction and trade professions and among 
drivers.  
As far as firm characteristics are concerned, Table 3 also displays the relation of economic 
branch and firm size to under-reporting. The cheating indicator is higher than average in con-
struction, trade and hotels and restaurants, while it is the lowest in financial services (where 
the share of MW earners is the smallest as well). Both the ratio of MW earners and cheating 
behavior are strongly negatively correlated with firm size: the cheating indicator is ten times 
higher for firms with 5-10 employees than for larger firms with more than 50 employees. For-
eign-owned enterprises tend to employ much less workers at the MW than domestic and 
mixed ones but the ratio of under-reporting among them does not differ substantially.  
 
The proportion of cheating firms (i.e. firms with at least one cheating employee) amounted to 
17.3 per cent of all firms and 37.0 per cent among enterprises having at least one MW earner. 
While the estimates confirm that, in 2006, envelope wages existed at a large scale, they sug-
gest that more than half of the MW earners did not receive cash supplement and the majority 
of firms paying MW did not cheat on taxes. However, for reasons discussed earlier the esti-
mates should be treated with caution and the model’s predictive power needs to be checked. 
 
7.  Testing the predictions of the DH: responses to the introduction of a minimum con-
tribution base 
 
As was briefly discussed earlier, the 2007 reform created incentives to raise the reported wag-
es of disguised MW earners. Cheating firms could fully avert the risk of audit by officially 
paying 2MW or more to their grey employees instead of MW. Furthermore, the public debate 
preceding the reform gave a clear warning that the tax authority would treat MW payment as 
a signal of tax evasion. Therefore, cheating firms had stronger motivation to shift their grey 
employees away from the MW while non-cheating enterprises, in the position to demonstrate 
that they pay ‘genuine’ MWs, had less incentive to raise the wages of their MW earners. 
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The sudden shift of the spike of the wage distribution from MW to 2MW in 2007 (shown ear-
lier by Figure 2) clearly indicated that firms – especially smaller ones – considered tax audit a 
credible threat. Before 2007, tax inspections were rather lax in Hungary. While firms employ-
ing more than 50 workers were checked by independent auditors and/or the tax authority an-
nually and the monitoring activities of the tax authority concentrated on “accentuated tax pay-
ers” (companies having the largest tax liabilities), entities without legal personality were mon-
itored only in every 7th year and individual entrepreneurs only in every 23rd year on average. 
Penalties were insignificant. Consistent with the reform’s intentions, the new regulation 
changed the wage distribution of small firms dramatically while larger firms were weakly 
affected.11 
 
We check how the wages of grey employees changed in response to the reform by estimating 
a probit equation (7) for a quasi-panel of individuals earning the MW in May 2006 and also 
observed in May 2007:  
 
(7) )()2( 0
*
01
*
1 γβ ZCMWwMWwP +Φ===  
 
In the equation, C denotes the dummy for cheating, Z comprises worker and firm characteris-
tics, and MW0 and MW1 stand for the minimum wage in 2006 and 2007. Base period MW 
earners are defined as those earning the exact amount of the minimum and those earning 95-
105 per cent of the minimum, alternatively. The expectation is that β>0.  
 
We use fraud indicators defined on the individual level since the reform affected only the fake 
minimum wage earners within firms: by shifting these particular employees away from the 
MW the enterprise could reduce the risk of audit.  
 
The cheating proxies in equation (7) come from the DH model hence they are predicted re-
gressors and the estimation of their effect by simple maximum likelihood would not yield 
valid results. Therefore, in calculating the standard errors in the equation we follow a two-step 
procedure. First, we simulate the parameter vector of the DH model from its asymptotic nor-
                                                 
11 The reform was initiated by a high (close to 10 per cent) budget deficit in 2006, and might be regarded as a 
simple form of presumptive taxation. For a discussion of the idea of presumptive taxation, practices in Italy, and 
an application to Bulgaria see Tanzi and Casanegra de Jantscher (1987), Arachi and Santoro (2007) and Pashev 
(2006), respectively. 
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mal distribution with its variance matrix, and create 100 simulated draws of firm-level cheat-
ing variables from the models. Second, using the different cheater classifications, we estimate 
equation (7) by bootstrap and finally take the sample mean and standard deviation of all simu-
lated parameters. This way, the cumulated parameter uncertainty of the two stages is quanti-
fied – by using the asymptotic variance matrix in the first stage and direct bootstrap in the 
second. For simplicity, in the following text and tables we refer to this procedure as “two-step 
bootstrap”. Note also that the resulting standard errors are only about 5 per cent larger than 
the ML standard errors of equation (7) because the error of the DH model, based on nearly 
100 thousand observations, is negligible compared to the error of the test equation.  
 
Table 4 
 
The descriptive statistics in Table 4 yield preliminary support to our hypothesis: cheating en-
terprises were more likely to move their (apparent) low-wage workers away from the MW 
and shift them to 2MW than non-cheating firms. The MW earners (as of 2006) employed by 
fraudulent firms were 40 per cent less likely to earn the MW in 2007, 2.3 times more likely to 
earn 2MW, and 2.2 times more likely to earn 2MW or more. 
 
The results from equation (7) are presented in Table 5. As shown in the first row, base-period 
MW earners classified as cheaters (victims of cheating) were significantly more likely to earn 
2MW in 2007 than non-cheating MW earners. The estimated marginal effect of being a cheat-
er amounts to 2.4 per cent when all controls are included – a remarkable impact if we take 
into account that the probability of earning 2MW1 in 2007 conditional on earning MW0 in 
2006 amounted to approximately 13 percent. In the second row of the table an alternative to 
equation (7) estimates the probability that a MW0 earner was shifted to or beyond 2MW1 i.e. 
the worker was moved out of the ‘danger zone’. The partial effects are positive and significant 
but lower. 
 
Table 5 
 
We may try to assess the magnitude of change induced by the 2007 reform and evaluate its 
economic significance in two ways. First, one can make back-on-the-envelope calculations 
relying on the results in Table 4, and taking into consideration that the share of MW earners 
amounted to 47.9 per cent in cheating firms and 5.7 per cent in non-cheating ones. This im-
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plies that the reported wages of 6.4 per cent and 0.3 per cent of the employees were doubled 
in the two groups of firms, respectively.12 Holding other wages constant these pay rises im-
plied 6.3 and 0.3 per cent increase in the average reported wages, respectively.  
 
Second, one may try to estimate the effect of cheating behavior on firm-level outcomes by 
estimating regressions of the form: 
 
εβ ++=∆ ZγCxln)8(  
 
where ∆lnx stands for the log changes in average wages, sales revenues and employment, al-
ternatively, while C and Z denote the firm-level cheater dummy and the controls, respectively. 
The equations are estimated for 5230 firms observed in 2006 and 2007, and the standard er-
rors are estimated with the two-step bootstrap procedure described earlier. In the wage equa-
tion we expect β>0 since raising the reported wages of grey employees must have increased 
the average reported wages of the cheating firms to some extent. The question of how actual 
costs and, therefore, output and employment were affected is more difficult to answer a pri-
ori. First, firms may have cut the cash payments of the affected workers, offsetting the impact 
of increased payroll taxes. Second, some of them may have increased the share of cash trans-
actions in order to economize on VAT instead of payroll taxes.  
 
Table 6 
 
The results presented in Table 6 suggest that the firm-level cheating proxy had positive effect 
on the change of observed average wages. Reported wages grew faster by 12 percentage 
points after controlling for industry, region, firm size, ownership and skill composition. The 
estimated gap between honest and dishonest firms is larger than the 6 percentage points dif-
ference calculated beforehand. This may result from the effect of the reform on other reported 
wages, or from unobserved shocks, for which we can not effectively control with the firm-
level variables at hand. 
 
                                                 
12 Recall that cheaters shifted 13.4 per cent of their MW earners to 2MW while the respective share was only 5.9 
per cent with non-cheaters. 
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In either case, the budgetary effect of the reform seems modest. According to the DH esti-
mates, approximately 170,000 workers, or 11 percent of the labor force represented by the 
Wage Survey, were employed by cheating firms. The average wages of these firms 
equaled 1.3 times the MW. Starting from these data and considering that the combined (em-
ployer and employee) social security contribution rate was 49 per cent and the lowest personal 
income tax rate was 18 per cent, we can estimate that the excess increase of reported wages in 
fraudulent firms resulted in an extra revenue of 12 billion Ft, or about 0.05 per cent of GDP. 
If we accept the back-on-the-envelope calculations, the budgetary effect is proportionally 
lower (about 6 billion Ft). 
 
The results indicate a significant negative effect on sales revenues and no effect on employ-
ment. A possible interpretation of this result is that the 2007 reform directed cheating enter-
prises to alternative forms of tax evasion and/or urged them to cut envelop wages. 
 
The results presented in this section proved robust to changes in the definition of cheating and 
specification of the individual and firm level regressions. Weighting had practically no impact 
on the parameters. Using the exact amounts of the MWs rather than brackets around them left 
the qualitative results unchanged in the individual regressions. We also examined the sensitiv-
ity of results to alternative cheating indicators based on the simulated wage (w>MW, w 
>1.1MW, w >1.5MW and w >2MW). Since there was no significant deviation from the pre-
sented results, the regressions using alternative indicators are not presented. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
While grey employment and disguised MWs are widely debated issues in many emerging 
market economies, few attempts have been made to measure their magnitude and distribution. 
We applied a double hurdle model to this issue for Hungary in a period in which the presump-
tions of the model seemed to fit i.e. censoring at the MW and wage under-reporting (at the 
MW) occurred simultaneously. If these preconditions are met, a properly specified DH model 
can estimate the ‘genuine’ wage distribution, permits the calculation of cheating probabilities 
and allows the simulation of ‘true’ earnings. 
 
The DH results for 2006 suggest that employers paid cash supplement to around half of all 
minimum wage employees, and hinted at a wide (150 per cent) gap between reported and ac-
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tual wages in these cases. The estimated distribution of under-reporting across occupations, 
industries and firm size seem to be consistent with the anecdotal evidence and survey-based 
results. The DH model makes strong assumptions about the wage distribution, and finding 
variables, which affect selection to cheating without affecting wages, is also rather difficult.  
 
Driven by the resulting uncertainty of the estimates, we conducted an experiment aimed at 
testing if the DH estimates have predictive power. It seems that the estimates worked well in 
the quasi-experimental setting analyzed in the paper: firms and workers suspected of tax eva-
sion responded differently to the strong shock under investigation.  
 
We obviously make both type 1 and type 2 errors in disentangling cheaters from non-cheaters 
but the results are encouraging for the analysis of ‘grey employment’ and, we believe, they 
also have practical importance. On the one hand, audits may be targeted by statistical profiles 
derived from the DH model, thereby improving compliance. However, by showing the loci of 
under-reporting the DH estimates also draw attention to the limits of tax enforcement. Dis-
guised minimum wages have high shares in services provided to households and small busi-
nesses, freelance occupations, and small firm management – an attribute that limits the poten-
tial budgetary intakes from more stringent inspection. Cash transactions between households 
and the providers of personal services are difficult, if not impossible, to detect. Grey transac-
tions of this kind can rather be whitened indirectly, by creating incentives to require receipts 
and making clear the link between reported income and access to publicly financed services 
and transfers such as pensions.  
 
On the other hand, the DH results call for more cautious MW policies. The micro-data do not 
support the popular belief that in Hungary ‘millions’ are fraudulently paid the minimum wage 
– an assumption that served as a justification for regulations like the minimum contribution to 
be paid after 2MW. Reducing the under-reporting of wages by means of substantially increas-
ing the MW and/or the tax burden on it is an undoubtedly cheap alternative to independent 
checks and carefully designed presumptive taxation. However, raising the costs of low-wage 
employment across the board is a poorly targeted policy, which can further reduce unskilled 
job opportunities: an undesirable outcome in a country, where six out of ten low-educated 
prime-age adults are out of work.  
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Table 1. Fraction paid the exact amount of the minimum wage in 2006 
 
 Per cent paid 
the MW  
Composition 
All MW earners=100 
Top managers 9.7   1.6 
Managers (heads of department, foremen, etc.) 3.6   2.2 
Managers of small firms (5-20 employees) 18.0   1.6 
Engineers 2.4   0.6 
Architects and construction technicians 9.5   0.3 
Professionals in health, education and social services (private) 3.5   0.0 
Other professionals 3.0   0.5 
Lawyers, business and tax advisors, accountants 8.8   0.7 
Freelance cultural occupations (musicians, actors, writers etc.) 16.5   0.5 
Technicians 7.3   2.7 
Administrators 8.3   6.8 
Agents, brokers 12.6   0.8 
Office workers 11.5   5.6 
Blue collars in retail trade and catering 22.5  15.3 
Blue collars in transport 7.7   0.1 
Services A (other than B and C) 12.7   1.5 
Services B (health and social services, private) 0.0   0.0 
Services C (personal services) 17.7   0.7 
Farmers and farm workers 20.9   5.1 
Blue collars in heavy industry and engineering 8.9   6.6 
Blue collars in light industry 14.6   9.2 
Blue collars in construction (house building) 21.0   10.0 
Blue collars in civil engineering (roads, railways, bridges) 20.0   0.6 
Assemblers and machine operators 4.7   4.3 
Truck drivers 20.5   3.8 
Porters, guards, cleaners 18.2   7.6 
Unskilled laborers, casual workers 37.6   11.2 
Total 10.8 100.0 
 
Source: Wage Survey, 2006, estimation sample of the DH model. Number of observations = 91,240  
Note: For this table some occupations were divided into parts on the basis of industrial affiliation and firm size 
in order to capture differences in the scope for cash transactions with customers (personal versus other types of 
services, small firm versus large firm managers). 
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Table 2. DH estimates of wages for 2006 
  Coefficient St. errora 
Wage equation for normalized log wages (also includes industry controls) 
Experience / 10 0.327*** 0.013 
Exp squared / 100 -0.049*** 0.002 
Male 0.205*** 0.011 
Vocational edu. 0.183*** 0.013 
Secondary edu. 0.485*** 0.015 
Higher edu. 1.191*** 0.019 
Budapest   0.135*** 0.023 
Value added per worker log 0.147*** 0.010 
Fixed assets per worker log  0.007 0.005 
Firm of foreign ownership 0.255*** 0.020 
Firm with 5-10 employees -0.404*** 0.037 
Firm with 11-20 employees -0.371*** 0.026 
Firm with 21-50 employees -0.233*** 0.024 
Firm with 51-300 employees -0.112*** 0.020 
Constant 0.255*** 0.020 
  
Selection equation  
Experience / 10 -0.408*** 0.070 
Exp squared / 100 0.108*** 0.015 
Male -0.214*** 0.050 
Vocational edu. 0.050 0.138 
Secondary edu. -0.128 0.127 
Higher edu. -0.012 0.136 
Managerial and freelanceb -0.392** 0.161 
Cash transactionsc -0.226** 0.113 
Retail traded -0.333*** 0.100 
Budapest   -0.244** 0.123 
Works in a city 0.112 0.091 
Works in a village -0.133 0.105 
Corporate tax payment / sales revenues 10.03** 4.00 
Other personnel related expenses /payroll 2.261*** 0.844 
Firm of foreign ownership 0.778*** 0.187 
Firm with 5-10 employees -2.007*** 0.272 
Firm with 11-20 employees -1.709*** 0.264 
Firm with 21-50 employees -1.404*** 0.270 
Firm with 51-300 employees -0.930*** 0.270 
Constant 3.074*** 0.315 
   
Rho   -0.302*** 0.047 
Sigma 0.547*** 0.008 
N of observations 91,240 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
a) Cluster robust standard errors, adjusted for firm-level clustering  
b) Managerial and freelance occupations (the latter includes professionals in culture and arts, agents and brokers) 
c) Occupations where cash transactions occur frequently. Includes car mechanics, electricians, plumbers,  
household employees, couriers, truck drivers and workers in personal services and house building (see Table A1). 
d) Occupations in retail trade (see Table A1)     
Data source: Wage Surveys 2006, private sector    
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Table 3. Predictions of the DH model for 2006 
 
  
Probability of un-
der-reporting 
among MW earn-
ers (per cent) 
Share of 
MW 
earners  
(per cent) 
Cheating indicator 
(per cent)b 
Simulated wage of 
cheaters  
(MW = 1.0) 
 (1)a (2)a   (1)a (2)a (1)a (2)a 
Total 46 48 11.9 5.5 5.7 2.6 2.4 
Occupations
c        
 Agriculture   31 29 27.5 8.6 7.9 2.3 1.8 
 Construction   45 56 23.4 10.6 13.0 1.9 1.8 
 Services   40 43 6.7 2.7 2.9 2.4 2.2 
 Trade   52 39 20.5 10.6 7.9 2.2 1.8 
 Industry   41 49 12.8 5.3 6.3 2.1 2.0 
 Other blue collar        
 Cleaners   18 13 23.8 4.2 3.2 2.5 1.6 
 Unskilled laborers   30 22 33.3 10.1 7.5 2.0 1.6 
 Machine operators   35 45 5.7 2.0 2.5 2.1 2.1 
 Porters and guards   38 24 15.6 5.9 3.7 2.5 1.6 
 Drivers   59 72 15.8 9.3 11.4 2.2 2.2 
 White collar        
 Office clerks   52 59 11.0 5.7 6.5 2.7 2.4 
 Technicians.    
assistants   72 84 5.3 3.8 4.4 3.2 2.8 
 Administrators   64 78 6.4 4.1 5.0 3.1 2.9 
 Managers   74 96 5.2 3.8 5.0 3.7 4.4 
 Professionals   94 97 2.5 2.4 2.4 5.1 5.1 
Industries        
 Agricult., fishing 34 37 15.9 5.4 5.9 2.4 2.5 
 Manufacturing 40 43 7.5 3.0 3.2 2.6 2.4 
 Construction 42 49 27.9 11.6 13.8 2.1 2.0 
 Trade 52 57 17.4 9.1 9.9 2.4 2.4 
 Hotels. restaurants 40 36 22.2 8.8 7.9 2.2 2.3 
 Transport 68 61 6.3 4.3 3.8 4.0 2.5 
 Financial services 72 35 2.4 1.7 0.8 3.6 3.6 
 Real estate. busi-
ness activities 51 47 12.0 6.2 5.6 3.1 2.8 
 Other 49 42 8.1 4.0 3.4 2.8 2.3 
Firm size        
5-10 employees 58 60 32.3 18.9 19.5 2.2 2.1 
11-20 employees 50 52 23.3 11.6 12.2 2.3 2.2 
21-50 employees 44 46 14.1 6.2 6.6 2.7 2.5 
51-300 employ-
ees 30 36 6.9 2.1 2.5 3.1 3.1 
300 + employees 7 7 1.0 0.1 0.1 5.8 7.7 
a) Models: wage equation with (1) industry dummies; (2) with occupation dummies 
b) Cheating indicator: share of cheating MW earners among all employees 
c) Occupations: see Table A1 in Appendix 
Data source: Wage Survey 2006. Number of observations: 91,240 
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Table 4: The wages of year 2006 MW earners in 2007 
 
 Earned the MW in 2006 and estimated to be 
Wage in 2007 non-cheater (per cent) cheater (per cent) 
MW 23.2 14.3 
Between MW and 2MW 70.0 71.0 
2MW 5.9 13.4 
Above 2MW 0.9 1.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Source: Wage Survey, MW earners in the worker panel of 2006-2007, Number of observations 3,940 
 
 
Table 5. The effect of estimated cheating behavior
a
 on wage adjustment  
between May 2006 and May 2007  
Probit marginal effects at the sample means 
 Controlsb  
 No Education All Number of 
observations 
Modelc Partial effect Z-value
d Partial effect Z-valued Partial effect Z-valued 
probit1 0.072 9.511*** 0.049 6.263*** 0.024 3.580*** 3940 
probit2 0.049 8.219*** 0.026 4.262*** 0.009 2.124** 22996 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
a) Individuals suspected of cheating in 2006 on the basis of the DH model 
b) Controls (all variables relate to 2006): dummies for education (college graduate, secondary school and vocational school), 
work experience in years, dummies for gender, municipality, and the logarithm of firm size. 
c) At probit1, the dependent variable is )|2( 0
*
01
*
1 MWwMWwP == , at probit2 )|2( 0
*
01
*
1 MWwMWwP =≥ . 
d) Based on two-step bootstrap standard errors, adjusted for clustering by firms  
Data source: Wage survey, MW earners in the worker panel of 2006-2007 
 
 
Table 6. The effects of estimated cheating behavior
a
 on the changes of 
selected firm-level indicators in 2006-2007 
OLS regressions 
 
 Controlsb Partial effect Z- valuec Number of obs. 
 
Change of average 
wage (log) 
No 0.1294 14.37*** 
5230 
Yes 0.1146 11.41*** 
     
Change of employ-
ment (log) 
No 0.0073 1.02 
5230 
Yes 0.0048 0.79 
     
Change of sales reve-
nues (log) 
No -0.0454 -3.21** 
4824 
Yes -0.0352 -2.33** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
a) Firms suspected of cheating in 2006 on the basis of the DH model 
b) Controls include skill shares, average wage, average age and dummies for sectors, regions, type of munici-
pality and state ownership. 
c) Based on two-step bootstrap standard errors, adjusted for clustering by firms 
Data source: panel of firms observed in the Wage Survey in 2006 and 2007. 
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Figure 1: The minimum wage and minimum wage earners in Hungary 1992-2009 
 
(A) The MW compared to the average wage and the me-
dian wage 1992-2009 
(B) Fraction paid 95-105 per cent of the MW, 1992-2009 
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The data relate to gross monthly earnings in the private sector. Data source: Wage Surveys 
 
 
Figure 2: The wage distribution in selected years 
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Data: Wage Surveys. Samples: full-timers in the private sector 
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Figure 3: The wage distribution in two occupations, 2006 
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Data: Wage Survey 2006, private sector. Occupational codes: managers 1311-1429, unskilled workers 9190 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Wage distribution before and after the transformation 
Data: Wage Survey 2006, private sector, full-timers 
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Figure 5: The function g(x) for r = 0.49 and its fit to the percentile graph 2000-2002 
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Appendix 1 
 
Table A1 Occupational classification used in the double-hurdle model 
Occupations    Type*    Definition (based on standard classification of occupations) 
 Agricultural    E    Codes 61-64 and 92 comprising the drivers of agricultural vehicles   
 Construction    S    Code 76   
 Service    S   
 Codes 52-53 except 532, 533 and 536. Includes transport, mail and 
telecommunication  
 Trade    S    Codes 51 and 421, 422 and 429 comprising cashiers   
 Industrial    S    Codes 71-75   
 Other blue-collar           
 Cleaners    E    Code 911   
 Unskilled laborers    E    Codes 913-919   
 Machine operators    E    Codes 81-83. Includes the operators of mobile machines such as cranes,   
 Porters and guards    E    Codes 912 and 536 comprising porters and security guards, respectively   
 Drivers    S   
 Code 833, 835, 836 Car, truck and bus. Excludes the drivers of agricul-
tural vehicles   
 White-collar           
 Office clerks    W   
 Codes 41-42 and 532-533 comprising office based jobs in health and 
social services   
Technicians, assistants    W    Codes 31-34   
 Administrators    W    Codes 35-39   
 Managers    W    Codes 11-14   
 Professionals    W    Codes 21-29   
* E: elementary; S: secondary; W: white-collar 
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Table A2. 
Selection to the worker panel used in the test (probit) 
  
 
Dependent variable: 1 if made it to the panel, 0 otherwise 
Marginal 
effect 
Z-value 
Male 0.013 6.05*** 
Years in school -0.000 -1.27 
Experience 0.009 25.68*** 
Experience squared -0.000 -19.94*** 
Earned more than the MW × log wage 0.013 5.52*** 
Earned the MW 0.099 3.13*** 
Firm size: 5-20 employees -0.110 -28.95*** 
Firm size: 21-50 employees -0.102 32.89*** 
Firm size: 51-300 employees -0.138 -65.07** 
Firm size: 301-1000 employees -0.003 -1.25 
Ownership: majority domestic private -0.048 -19.92*** 
Ownership: majority foreign -0.013 -4.54*** 
Ownership: mixed 0.021 4.21*** 
Sales revenues per worker (log) -0.008 8.53*** 
Negative value added -0.009 -0.64 
Micro-region unemployment rate (log) -0.414 -5.69*** 
Western Hungary 0.027 7.23*** 
Northern Transdanubia 0.064 16.20*** 
Southern Transdanubia 0.059 12.15*** 
Southern Plain -0.024 -5.26 
Northern Plain 0.091 19.69*** 
Northern Hungary 0.114 25.78*** 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 0.131 24.92*** 
Mining 0.154 6.69*** 
Construction -0.013 3.41*** 
Trade, tourism 0.030 11.49*** 
Transport -0.051 -8.17*** 
Financial services -0.032 -8.50*** 
Services -0.164 -4.46*** 
Education and health (private establishments) 0.035 6.22*** 
Observations 132115  
LR chi2 (30), significance 8473.98 0.0000 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Reference categories: female, more than 1000 employees, majority state-owned, Central Hungary, manufacturing  
Data: Wage Survey 2006, enterprise sector. All variables relate to May 2006.  
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Table A3 
Selection to the firm panel used in the test (probit) 
 
Dependent variable: 1 if observed in the 2006 WS, 0 otherwise 
Marginal 
effect 
Z-value 
Share of men  0.000 0.01 
Average years in school  0.000 0.01 
Average experience  0.000 0.02 
Average wage  0.000 0.00 
Share of workers affected by the 2001 MW hike -0.000 -0.000 
Firm size: 5-20 employees -0.368 -12.47*** 
Firm size: 21-50 employees -0.355 -12.27*** 
Firm size: 51-300 employees -0.375 -13.49*** 
Firm size: 301-1000 employees -0.053 -2.17*** 
Ownership: majority domestic private -0.036 -2.54** 
Ownership: majority foreign -0.058 -3.08*** 
Ownership: mixed  0.059 1.58 
Sales revenues per worker (log)  0.000 0.00 
Negative value added -0.101 -1.20 
Micro-region unemployment rate (log)  0.008 0.02 
Western Hungary -0.022 -0.96 
Northern Transdanubia -0.018 -0.75 
Southern Transdanubia  0.031 1.29 
Southern Plain  0.019 0.83 
Northern Plain   0.011 0.51 
Northern Hungary  0.050 2.38 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing  0.013 0.61 
Mining  0.091 1.05 
Construction -0.037 -1.93* 
Trade, tourism -0.021 -1.53 
Transport -0.053 -1.75* 
Financial services -0.020 -1.11 
Services -0.248 --1.37 
Education and health (private establishments) -0.030 -1.19 
Firms in WS 2006 9574  
Firms also observed in WS 2007 6348  
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Data: Wage Survey 2006   
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Appendix 2 
 
Minimum wage regulations in Hungary 
 
Target and coverage. A single national monthly gross minimum wage was introduced by 
Hungary’s last communist-led government in 1989. The minimum wage relates to monthly 
pre-tax base wages, that is, total monthly earnings net of overtime pay, shift pay and bonus-
es. Starting from 2007 weekly, daily and hourly levels are determined, too. The minimum 
wage is legally binding and covers all wages, including those paid to the self-employed by 
their own businesses. For part-timers, who account for about 5 per cent of total employment, 
the wage floor is proportionately lower.  In 2006-2008 further minima applied to skilled 
workers (1.25MW) and young skilled workers (1.2MW). In 2009 the minimum for young 
skilled workers was abolished. 
MW setting. The minimum wage is negotiated in a consultative body of employers and un-
ions (Council of the Reconciliation of Interests). The government usually steps into the pro-
cess at the end, by accepting the recommendations of the Council, but it is authorised to 
make a unilateral decision in case the negotiations fail, as it happened in 2001.  
Level of the MW. At its introduction the MW amounted to 35 per cent of the average wage 
(AW), while in 2000 it stood at 29 per cent. Viktor Orbán’s first government (1998–2002) 
nearly doubled the MW, by raising it from Ft 25,500 in December 2000 to Ft 40,000 in Jan-
uary 2001 and Ft 50,000 in January 2002. The two hikes raised the minimum wage–average 
wage ratio to 39 per cent and 43 per cent, respectively. Since 2003, the MW/AW ratio 
slightly fell but remained above its pre-hike level.13 
Compliance.  The Wage Survey’s data suggest that sub-minimum wages accounted for less 
than 1 per cent of all wages in each year since 1989. Estimates based on personal income 
tax reports and pension contributions hint at higher rates, but these data do not allow proper 
adjustment for time out of work during the year.  
Fraction of employees affected. The fraction of workers paid 95–105 per cent of the MW 
amounted to 5 per cent in 2000. It jumped to 19 per cent in May 2002 in firms employing 
five or more workers and increased substantially in larger firms, too. The ratio fell to 10–12 
per cent by 2004 and fell further substantially after 2006, when the tax authority started to 
interpret MW payment as a signal of wage under-reporting.  
Taxing the MW. In 1989-2001 the MW was subject to linear social security contribution and 
progressive personal income tax. In 2002 it became free of personal income tax. In 2007, a 
minimum social security contribution base amounting to 2MW was introduced, as discussed 
in Section 3 of the text. This measure was abandoned in 2010.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 All data quoted in Appendix 2 come from the Wage Survey. 
